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CORRESPONDENCE 
To the editors: 
Word had come of Herman Belz's attack on me and A March 
of Liberty several days before the Summer issue of Constitutional 
Commentary arrived, and so it was with some interest that I turned 
to the fifteen-page "review." 
Evidently, my abiding sin in Professor Belz's eyes is that I am a 
"liberal," and that from this unpardonable crime all sorts of hei-
nous results flow, including my support of the Supreme Court's ex-
pansion and defense of civil rights and liberties. 
While I could certainly respond to Belz in kind ("You're a con-
servative!!!), I think the readers of Constitutional Commentary might 
well wish to look at the book themselves. It is, after all, a text for 
college and graduate courses in constitutional history, and has even 
been adopted in some law schools. They might also wish to com-
pare how I treat issues with that of a competitor, Professor Belz's 
revision of Kelly and Harbison. 
Herman Belz replies: 
Sincerely, 
Melvin I. Urofsky 
Professor of History 
Virginia Commonwealth 
University 
For reasons that he chooses not to disclose, Professor Urofsky 
does not dispute any of the details of my analysis of his book. He 
misunderstands in asserting that I hold his liberalism to be a sin, 
from which flows his support of civil liberties. It is his uncritical 
support-as he concedes--of civil rights and civil liberties that 
leads him into his inaccuracies and scholarly errors. 
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To the editors: 
Lino A. Graglia must have felt he really had something to say 
about the growing field of Law and Literature. After all, his review 
of Richard Posner's new book had already been published else-
where before it appeared in the pages of this journal (vol. 6, p. 437); 
but unless your editors were looking for an adulatory piece about 
Posner, I question the wisdom of revivifying Graglia's superficial 
analyses. 
Graglia, unlike some four dozen law professors now teaching 
in the field (see Elizabeth Gemmette's survey of Law and Literature 
teaching at 23 Valparaiso L. Rev. 267), was ill-prepared to comment 
intelligently about one of the major interdisciplinary movements of 
our generation. He seems to excuse his own ignorance early in the 
review, when he observes generally about lawyers that a "crafts-
man's scrupulousness" need not define our work. 
Perhaps Graglia feels that way, but I am sure most lawyers-
and certainly most law professors-aspire to craftsmanship and 
care in their work. Given his own standard, Graglia not surpris-
ingly relies almost entirely upon Posner to teach him about litera-
ture. Yet Posner's book quickly situates its author as an "amateur" 
in matters literary, and this journal's readers might have hoped for 
a more objective critique of the book's incessant belligerence against 
earlier scholars' efforts. 
Ironically, Graglia manages to make this point late in his re-
view, but he is speaking there about unnamed practitioners of Law 
and Literature who need meet "less demanding" standards of liter-
ary criticism and theory than those actually in literature depart-
ments. Yet this unproven assertion would apply far more to Posner 
(and to Graglia himself) than to those who have pioneered law 
school work in the field. Indeed, the comment also serves to char-
acterize much of the Law and Economics field, which Graglia 
otherwise worships in an almost kneejerk reflex. Posner would be 
the first to admit that his economic analyses may not meet with the 
approval of a majority of "real" economists in the academy. 
The point is that Law and Literature, like Law and Economics, 
has had much to say to a legal academy dissatisfied with the nar-
rowing unidisciplinary constraints of the past few decades. Its prac-
titioners-including James Boyd White and the present writer, who 
both fall prey to Graglia's absolutely mindless attack in the re-
view-often have considerably more formal training in literature 
than legal economists have in economics. In fact, our work actually 
crosses the disciplinary frontier; my own approach to Dostoevski's 
legal obsession has recently been incorporated in critical editions of 
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Notes From Underground and Crime and Punishment, and the Mel-
ville world has been most sensitive to law school debates on Billy 
Budd, Sailor. 
The only paragraph of real analysis-rather than uncritical 
parroting-occurs when Graglia tries to understand why a cost-ef-
fective writer like Posner would spend so much of his time attack-
ing Law and Literature. Graglia claims that Posner "has scores to 
settle" with those who have disliked his brand of legal economics. 
If true, this would be a damning description of the motives behind a 
book-length effort; but in fact I (and most others in the field) have 
never deigned to criticize Posner. (An exception is Robin West, 
whose comparison of Posner and Kafka made quite a hit in the 
Harvard Law Review recently, but Graglia strangely overlooks Pro-
fessor West.) 
Posner surely has good reason to enter the fray, and Graglia 
has identified one unedifying motivation. But, had he read Posner 
carefully, or even a small fraction of the primary and secondary 
works the judge has perused (if often misunderstood), Graglia 
would have perceived the rich menu offered by Law and Literature 
to the legal world. Posner allows, for example, that central legal 
issues such as the repression of revenge-urges are best addressed by 
literary art. Other scholars have suggested that only fictional works 
about law provide a full jurisprudential comprehension of the vir-
tual identity between rhetoric and performance in our legal system. 
Posner seizes the implication of the latter idea and applauds a re-
newal of legal stylistics; but he steadfastly declines the literature's 
associated offer; to scrutinze the ethical base for the lawyer's often 
articulate formulations. 
Most earlier legal generations in our country took the literary 
sources for law as a given (see Robert Ferguson's Law and Letters 
in American Culture). For us, the Law and Literature movement 
uniquely appreciates the fundamental sources-the life-affirming 
sources-of law in its surrounding literary culture. 
If Posner does fear, then, the incursion of Law and Literature 
upon his own relatively arid and dull interdisciplinary turf, Grag-
lia's unthinking acceptance of that fear can only be explained by the 
following syllogism, pervasive in his review: Law and Literature 
threatens a certain system of legal economics; that system is good; 
Law and Literature is bad. But, uncraftsmanlike though he may be, 
Graglia cannot hope to see that logic succeed with the vast majority 
of this journal's readers. 
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Let those readers scan Posner's book. Then let them read care-
fully the literary works Posner musters for his arguments and the 
secondary works he dismisses out of fear. 
Lino Graglia replies: 
Richard Weisberg 
Visiting Professor of Law 
UCLA, and 
Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School 
"Graglia must have felt he really had something to say" about 
law and literature! Gimme a break, I'm asked to review a book and 
I review a book. Who needs something to say? It's true that Posner 
and I are not as high on literary studies in law school as Weisberg, 
but that does not show either Posner's "incessant belligerence" or 
that I made an "absolutely mindless attack" on White and 
Weisberg. Posner's discussion strikes me as quite peaceful, and my 
basic criticism of White was that he says things like a judge should 
determine what a decision "shall mean in the language of a 
culture." The world divides into people who like that kind of talk 
(law and lits) and those who consider it hot air; the latter may well 
be insufficiently sensitive or perceptive, but they are not necessarily 
mindless. If anything, they may be too much into real thought. 
I am disappointed that literary study apparently does not 
improve one's argumentation, either in substance, as by making it 
less of a game and less pandering-"! am sure most lawyers-and 
certainly most law professors" are scrupulous-or in style, as by 
moderating the lawyer's urge to overstatement-"absolutely 
mindless"? 
"Who is Graglia," Weisberg might reply, "to complain of 
overstatement?" But that of course would be unfair, because I am 
not only, as he says of Posner, "an 'amateur' in matters literary," 
but, even worse, an amateur without quotation marks. 
